应管理学院运营与财务管理研究所罗劲博教授邀请，纽约城市大学李雪君教授将做客至公会计论坛，并带来精彩报告。欢迎感兴趣的老师和同学参加！

讲座主题：Why Do Firms Withhold Loan Contract Details?An Incomplete Contracting Explanation

主 讲 人：李雪君  教授

主 持 人：罗劲博  教授

讲座时间：2020年11月10日10:00-12:00

讲座地点：Zoom线上会议（ID: 873 5762 6185；Passcode: lzu）

讲座简介：Theory suggests that greater information asymmetry between firms and lenders entails allocating stronger decision rights to the latter through tighter covenants. While tighter covenants could be more likely violated, they are often relaxed later, upon contract renegotiation. We hypothesize that in such an incomplete contracting framework, greater information asymmetry gives firms more incentives to withhold information about the initial covenants from the public, to avoid overstating contractual constraints and preclude harmful reactions to violations that may be cured via renegotiations. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our findings are stronger when contracts likely contain more performance covenants to facilitate more frequent decision right transfers to lenders. Our inferences are robust to controlling for firms’ obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality), proprietary costs, and future performance. While prior research has long recognized that the details of a significant portion of loan contracts are not publicly available, we are the first to provide an explanation from the incomplete contracting perspective.

主讲人简介：

李雪君，纽约城市大学柏鲁克分校（Baruch College）会计系终身教授、博士生项目主管。本科毕业于清华大学经管学院，硕士毕业于伊利诺伊大学香槟分校，并在密歇根州立大学获会计学博士学位。曾任教于罗彻斯特大学西蒙商学院。主要研究领域是证券监管、企业信息披露、媒体与资本市场。研究成果发表于The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Management Science等国际顶尖刊物。